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11 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
12 COUNTY OF MONTEREY

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14 ROYAL CALKINS  
Petitioner,  
15  
16 v.  
17 CITY OF CARMEL-BY-THE-SEA, and  
Does 1 through 10, inclusive,  
18 Respondents.

**Case No.:**

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF  
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE**

Date: July 12, 2018  
Time: 10:00 a.m.  
Dept.: 13

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21 Petitioner Royal Calkins (“Calkins” or “Petitioner”) relies on the following points and  
22 authorities in support of his Petition for Writ of Mandate compelling Respondent City of Carmel-  
23 by-the-Sea (“City” or “Respondent”) to disclose public records in accordance with the provisions  
24 of the California Public Records Act, Government Code §§ 6250 *et seq.*:

**INTRODUCTION**

25  
26 The California Public Records Act was enacted to allow the public to review, and to  
27 request copies of, records regarding the conduct of their government. “In enacting this chapter, the  
28 Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to

1 information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right  
2 of every person in this state.” Government Code § 6250 (together with the statutes that follow, the  
3 “Act”). The governmental records at issue here exist clearly in the arena of public records and  
4 there is no legal justification to deny the public its statutory and constitutional right of access to  
5 them.

6 Here, City’s long-time City Attorney retired and City issued a form of Request for  
7 Qualifications (“RFQ”) for completion by anyone interested in replacing him. Attorney Glen R.  
8 Mozingo (“Mozingo”) responded to the RFQ with an impressive list of qualifications, including  
9 awards he said that he received, numerous accomplishments he said that he completed, and more.  
10 Ultimately, Mozingo was offered the position and a contract was signed between Mozingo’s  
11 professional corporation and the City for the former to provide the latter with legal services.

12 In the ensuing months, questions arose about the truthfulness of Mozingo’s  
13 response to the RFQ. As it became apparent that portions of that response were fabricated, and  
14 that others were, at best, grossly misleading, Mozingo refused to respond to inquiries. On July 5,  
15 2018, Mozingo brought to a closed session of the City Council (“Council”) documentation  
16 ostensibly supporting his RFQ response. The Council then considered all of that material before  
17 returning it to Mozingo and stating in an open session of the Council that Mozingo’s response to  
18 the RFQ was absolutely truthful. The Council thereafter refused to make available to the public  
19 any of that material in large part because, it said, it no longer had the records and therefore could  
20 not grant anyone access to them. This proceeding then commenced.

## 21 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

22 The salient facts, recounted in the Petition, are not in dispute. Questions arose as to  
23 the accuracy of Mozingo’s RFQ response, Mozingo brought what has been described as  
24 documentation supporting his response to a closed session of the Council, and retrieved that  
25 documentation at the end of the closed session of the Council. The Council apparently reviewed  
26 that documentation and said that “[w]e can assure you that this thorough review confirms that Mr.  
27 Mozingo’s resume was correct in every manner and that the representations, allegations and

1 challenges to that resume are entirely without merit. In other words, the Council said “trust us.”  
2 But the Public Records Act was enacted to allow members of the public to see public records  
3 themselves rather than have to accept a governmental “trust us.”

#### 4 **LEGAL ARGUMENT**

5 As is noted above, Government Code § 6250 sets the philosophical purpose of the  
6 Act – making the records of the conduct of the people’s government open to the public.  
7 Government Code § 6252 provides the definitions for the key words used in the Act. Relevant  
8 here are the definitions of “local agency” – “a county; city, whether general law or chartered; city  
9 and county; school district; municipal corporation; district; political subdivision; or any board,  
10 commission or agency thereof; other local public agency; or entities that are legislative bodies of a  
11 local agency pursuant to subdivisions (c) and (d) of Section 54952” – and “public records” – “any  
12 writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared, owned,  
13 used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics.”

14 Government Code § 6253 sets forth the rules governing access to public records:

15  
16 (a) Public records are open to inspection at all times during the office  
17 hours of the state or local agency and every person has a right to  
18 inspect any public record, except as hereafter provided. Any  
19 reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be available for  
20 inspection by any person requesting the record after deletion of the  
21 portions that are exempted by law.

22 (b) Except with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by  
23 express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a request  
24 for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record  
25 or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person  
26 upon payment of fees covering direct costs of duplication, or a  
27 statutory fee if applicable. Upon request, an exact copy shall be  
28 provided unless impracticable to do so.

23 Government Code § 6258 provides the mechanism for enforcement of the right of access:

24  
25 Any person may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative  
26 relief or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to  
27 enforce his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public  
28 record or class of public records under this chapter. The times for  
responsive pleadings and for hearings in these proceedings shall be  
set by the judge of the court with the object of securing a decision as

to these matters at the earliest possible time.

Government Code § 6259 sets the procedure for a legal action brought to enforce the Act:

(a) Whenever it is made to appear by verified petition to the superior court of the county where the records or some part thereof are situated that certain public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public, the court shall order the officer or person charged with withholding the records to disclose the public record or show cause why he or she should not do so. The court shall decide the case after examining the record in camera, if permitted by subdivision (b) of Section 915 of the Evidence Code, papers filed by the parties and any oral argument and additional evidence as the court may allow.

(b) If the court finds that the public official's decision to refuse disclosure is not justified under Section 6254 or 6255, he or she shall order the public official to make the record public. If the judge determines that the public official was justified in refusing to make the record public, he or she shall return the item to the public official without disclosing its content with an order supporting the decision refusing disclosure. . . .

(d) The court shall award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiff should the plaintiff prevail in litigation filed pursuant to this section. The costs and fees shall be paid by the public agency of which the public official is a member or employee and shall not become a personal liability of the public official. If the court finds that the plaintiff's case is clearly frivolous, it shall award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the public agency.

There is no credible argument here that the records sought are not public records under the Act; each constitutes a "writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business" – the hiring of Glen Mazingo as City Attorney and the resolution of claims that his Response to the RFQ is riddled by fabrications – "prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency . . ." Nor is there be any credible argument that the records are exempt from public inspection pursuant to Government Code §§ 6254 or 6255.

Respondent is left with but a single argument against the disclosure of the records at issue here: That the records do not belong to the City and the City does not have a copy. Established case law makes clear that such a contention has no merit.

In *City of San Jose v. Superior Court* (2017) 2 Cal.5<sup>th</sup> 608, a member of the public

1 sought numerous records from the city of San Jose and its officials. The targeted documents  
2 concerned redevelopment efforts in downtown San Jose and included e-mails and text messages  
3 “sent or received on private electronic devices used by” the mayor, two city council members, and  
4 their staffs. The City disclosed communications made using City telephone numbers and e-mail  
5 accounts but did not disclose communications made using the individuals’ personal accounts. It  
6 contended that such records belonged to the officials, and were not within the custody or control of  
7 the City. In a unanimous Opinion, the California Supreme Court disagreed.

8           After addressing the standard rules of statutory interpretation, the Court recognized  
9 that in cases implicating the Act, “this standard approach to statutory interpretation is augmented  
10 by a constitutional imperative. (See *Sierra Club v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 57 Cal.4th at p. 166.)”

11           Proposition 59 amended the Constitution to provide “A statute,  
12 court rule, or other authority, including those in effect on the  
13 effective date of this subdivision, shall be *broadly* construed if it  
14 furthers the people’s right of access, and *narrowly* construed if it  
15 limits the right of access.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2), italics  
16 added.) ““Given the strong public policy of the people’s right to  
17 information concerning the people’s business (Gov. Code, § 6250),  
18 and the constitutional mandate to construe statutes limiting the right  
19 of access narrowly (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2)), “all public  
20 records are subject to disclosure unless the Legislature has *expressly*  
21 provided to the contrary.”” (*Sierra Club*, at p. 166.)

22           *City of San Jose v. Superior Court* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 617. The City of San Jose argued that it  
23 did not have possession of the requested records, but the Court recognized that:

24           Appellate courts have generally concluded that records related to  
25 public business are subject to disclosure if they are in an agency's  
26 actual *or constructive* possession. (See, e.g., *Board of Pilot*  
27 *Commissioners v. Superior Court* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 577, 598  
28 [160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285]; *Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. Superior*  
*Court* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 697, 710 [140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622]  
(*Consolidated Irrigation*.) “[A]n agency has constructive possession  
of records if it has the right to control the records, either directly or  
through another person.”

29           *City of San Jose v. Superior Court*, *supra*, 2 Cal. 5th at 623. In his response to the RFQ, Mozingo

1 claimed to have qualifications that added weight to his application. When his claims were  
2 challenged he brought documents to the Council that he said support his RFQ response, allowed  
3 the Council to review them, and then whisked them away when the closed session concluded.  
4 There is no question that those documents were *used* by the Council to reach its conclusion as to  
5 the ostensible accuracy of Mozingo’s representations in his RFQ response and are producible  
6 public records. The Council continues to try to shield those records from public examination –  
7 perhaps because they are embarrassing to the Committee and the Council as well as Mozingo – and  
8 instead embrace the classic “trust us” attitude that courts routinely find wanting.

9  
10 It is no answer to say, as did the Court of Appeal, that we must  
11 presume public officials conduct official business in the public’s best  
12 interest. The Constitution neither creates nor requires such an  
13 optimistic presumption. Indeed, the rationale behind the Act is that it  
14 is for the *public* to make that determination, based on information to  
15 which it is entitled under the law. Open access to government  
16 records is essential to *verify* that government officials are acting  
17 responsibly and held accountable to the public they serve. (*CBS, Inc.*  
18 *v. Block* (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 651 [230 Cal. Rptr. 362, 725 P.2d  
19 470].) “Such access permits checks against the arbitrary exercise of  
20 official power and secrecy in the political process.” (*Ibid.*) The  
21 whole purpose of CPRA is to ensure transparency in government  
22 activities.

17 *City of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra*, 2 Cal. 5th at 625.

18  
19 In *San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court* (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, the City of  
20 West Covina entered into a long-term contract with a private waste disposal company under which  
21 the waste disposal company collected waste in exchange for payments by the City outlined in the  
22 contract. In accordance with the terms terms of the contract, the waste disposal company sought a  
23 rate increase. Relying on financial data supplied by the waste disposal company, the City approved  
24 a proposed rate increase of 15 to 25 percent over a two-year period. The *San Gabriel Tribune*, a  
25 newspaper, sought disclosure of the financial data submitted by the disposal company and relied  
26 upon by the City in granting the rate increase. The City refused, and the newspaper brought a  
27 petition in the superior court for a writ of mandate to compel disclosure of the records pursuant to

1 the Act. The superior court denied the writ, in part because of the City's promise to keep the  
2 relevant financial records supporting the proposed rate increase confidential. The Court of Appeal  
3 reversed.

4  
5 We conclude that the financial data that the City relied on in granting  
6 the rate increase constitutes a public record subject to public  
7 disclosure. The City has a contractual relationship with the Disposal  
8 Company. The City delegated its duty of trash collection to the  
9 Disposal Company but still retained the power and duty to monitor  
10 the Disposal Company's performance of its delegated duties, under  
11 the express terms of the contract.

12  
13 *San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, supra*, 143 Cal.App.3d at 775. The same is true of the  
14 contract between G.R. Mozingo, Esq, APC and the City.

15  
16 Assurances of confidentiality by the City to the Disposal Company  
17 that the data would remain private was not sufficient to convert what  
18 was a public record into a private record. (*Johnson v. Winter* (1982)  
19 127 Cal.App.3d 435, 439 [179 Cal.Rptr. 585].) Unless one of the  
20 exemptions applies to bar disclosure then the City must yield to its  
21 statutory duty that compels disclosure of the data.

22 *Ibid.*

23  
24 [I]n the case at bench, the City publicly based its decision on  
25 financial data supplied to it by the Disposal Company. It cannot now  
26 be heard to call for concealment after it voluntarily injected the data  
27 into the decision-making process of government. This was precisely  
28 the type of governmental action that the Brown Act and the Public  
Disclosure Act were designed to keep open to public scrutiny.

*Id.* at 778.

Petitioners argue that respondent Disposal Company waived any  
privacy interests it may have had by voluntarily injecting itself into  
the public arena by seeking a rate increase and submitting financial  
data in support of same . . . We agree . . . respondent City publicly  
based its decision to grant the rate increase on financial data  
voluntarily submitted by the Disposal Company. Any privacy  
interest that may have existed in this data was converted once it was  
used not only to support but to justify the rate increase.

1 *Id.* at 780-81. The same is true here; the City relied on Mozingo’s representations to contract with  
2 his professional corporation, and on the documents he brought to a Council meeting to support  
3 those representations. The records shown to the Council and referenced in the Council’s public  
4 statement are public records, and as such must be disclosed to the public.

5 The access by the public to public information is one of the bedrock principles of  
6 our system of governance. And for good reason.

7  
8 “Nearly two hundred years ago, James Madison stated, [knowledge]  
9 will forever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their  
10 own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge  
11 gives. A popular government without popular information or the  
12 means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or  
13 perhaps both” (Schaffer, *supra*, pp. 203, 204 quoting from S. Rep.  
14 No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1 (1965).)

12 *Id.* at 772. Under constitutional and statutory precedent his Court has the power, and the  
13 obligation, to prevent the government of the City from becoming either by requiring that public  
14 records remain public.

15 **CONCLUSION**

16 For all of the foregoing reasons, and based on the evidence contained in the Petition  
17 filed herewith, this Court should issue an alternative writ of mandate commanding the City to  
18 provide access to those records reviewed by the Council in making the decision expressed by  
19 Council Member Carrie Theis on June 5, 2018, and subscribed to by the other four members of the  
20 Council, or to show cause why it should not be required to do so. Following a hearing on the  
21 Petition, this Court should issue a peremptory writ of mandate commanding such public access.  
22

23 Dated: July 7, 2018

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24  
25 By \_\_\_\_\_  
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